January, 1933

LEGISLATION
NECESSITY OF STATUTORY PROTECTION OF THE RI-GHT OF PRIVAcY-The

urge to profit by satisfying and further stimulating prurient tastes through the
dissemination of the-intimacies of private lives, the aggression with which supersalesmen invade otherwise secluded surroundings, and the appropriation of
attributes of personality for advertising and commercial purposes make it timely
to ascertain whether- or not existing judicial authority is competent to afford
relief to the unfortunate who has been injured by such activity.
TO say precisely what is meant by the "right of privacy" is a difficult
matter. In theory, the injury done by a violation of this "right" is an injury
to feelings or state of mind.' It is an injury to the individual subjectively, and
not to his property or reputation. Therein privacy may be distinguished from
libel and slander, which deal "only with damage to reputation, with the injury
done to the individual in his external relations to the community, by lowering
him in the estimation of his fellows." 2 The right of privacy deals with painful
mental effects. Moreover, truth is no defense'in this type of case.
An invasion of the right of privacy may be distinguished from an assault
in that the element of fear or apprehension of bodily harm, necessary to an
assault, need not be present as an essential element of privacy invasion. It
differs from "the interest in the freedom from disagreeable emotions" (though
invasions of privacy result in disagreeable emotions) in that, in the latter interest,
there is no desire on the part of the injured person to keep himself or some
attribute of his personality secret and secluded from outsiders.
No evidence of pecuniary loss need be introduced to recover damages for
an invasion of the right of privacy.'

Proof of the invasion of the right carries

with it a presumption, of damages, the amount of which is to be ascertained by
the jury.
The leading article on this subject' was written, in 189 o , by Professor
Samuel Warren and Mr. Justice Brandeis. The innovation of the "yellow
press" was to a great extent responsible for its appearance. Therefore, to these
authors a violation of privacy meant, roughly, the publication of that which the
person concerned desired to keep to himself, and which, when made public,
injured his mental state or feelings. They did not deal with activities directed
against a person himself, such as personal intrusion into the solitude of his
physical surroundings, or shadowing by detectives. A summary of their conception of the right of privacy and its limitations is as follows: regardless of
truth or malice, -no one shall, without the permission of the individual concerned, make public by written, printed, or photographic representations, the
likeness of, or anything concerning the peculiarities of personality, the intimate
mode of life, and intimate relations and actions of that individual, unless necessary to be disclosed in a court of law or other governmental body, or unless
pertinent to his life as a candidate for or -holder of public office, or to his
"quasi-public" avocation, i. e., one naturally attendant with publicity. Oral
representations were not included in the "right" since it was felt that they did
not present a problem sufficiently serious for the courts' concern.
"Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy (89o)

4 HARv. L. REv. 193, 197.

2Ibid.
' Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co., 122 Ga. 19o, 50 S. E. 68 (19o5) ; Kunz
v. Allen, io2 Kan. 883, 172 Pac. 532 (918).

'Supra note I.
(324)
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The interests usually included in the right of privacy are analyzed and
classified in a recent article r by Dean Leon Green. He first points out the
general recognition that the interests involved in "privacy" cases are interests
of personality, rather than property interests or "interests in relations with
other persons". "The tort cases", he says,8 "which courts most frequently
bring under the 'privacy' rubric, or else treat as anomalies, involve an interest
of personality which has been subjected to the harm of appropriation" (as
contrasted to the harm of "defamation" or "physical harms"). He then subclassifies interests of personality as follows: (i) Physical integrity, (2) Feelings or emotions, (3) Capacity for activity or service, (4) Name, (5) Likeness,
(6) History, and (7) Privacy. "Privacy", he believes, is only one of several
interests brought under the "right of privacy". To him, "privacy" means a
seclusion, isolation, solitude with regard to the person himself, as distinguished
from his name, likeness, history, etc. This interpretation of the word may
best be understood by noticing the nature of the complaints in the cases classified
by him under "privacy" : 7 shadowing by detectives, intrusion into the plaintiff's
stateroom, defendant's gaining admission into the plaintiff's bedroom during
childbirth by representing that he was a doctor, and finally, listening to plaintiff's telephone conversation by means of wire-tapping. These, therefore, are
to Green the true "privacy" cases. He contends that "to bring cases involving
the appropriation of all phases of the personality under this title [privacy]
creates a disturbing sense of artificiality. The term is too narrow and too lacking
in descriptive coloring"."
It is believed that such limitation on the meaning of the word "privacy" is
too great. The Warren-Brandeis article, which really formulated the "right of
privacy", did not as much as mention that interest which Dean Green calls
"privacy". Under his classification, the interests for which these earlier writers
advocated protection are name, likeness, and history. Thus, Green seeks to give
the word a meaning which entirely excludes the meaning that was originally
attributed to "right of privacy". Even if we assume that the word "privacy"
is, in a dictionary sense, too lacking in descriptive coloring and too narrow in
import, it should be realized that judicial decisions have broadened its scope,
and, by using the word in connection with certain types of cases, have given it
such color that today when the phrase "right of privacy" is used, it gives a
rather definite connotation of what is involved. Without being inaccurate, the
phrase may be used to include what Dean Green calls "history, name, likeness,
and privacy". Such is what the lawyer believes it to mean. Why cast that
meaning aside?
"Interests in relations with other persons" have been treated under the
"right of privacy". 9 Suppose, for example, a tabloid newspaper publishes an
unsavory story about a man who has recently died and his son sues for damages,
alleging that his "right of privacy" has been invaded. Even a court which
might otherwise recognize the right of privacy would probably deny recovery
on the theory that the privacy invaded was that of the father, and, therefore,
the tort died with him. Since the interest in this type of case is not clearly
described by the phrase "right of privacy", the average court would probably
fail to see that any interest of the plaintiff was harmed. "Family Privacy"
might be more handy, even though less accurate, than Dean Green's "interests in
relations with other persons".
"Green,
The Right of Privacy
11d. at 239.

(1932) 27 ILL.

L. REV. 237.

at 252 et seq.
8
Id. at 239.
7Id.

Corliss v. Walker, 64 Fed. 28o (C. C. D. Mass. 1894) ; Atkinson v. Doherty, 121 Mich.

372, 8o N. W. 285 (1899) ; Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N. Y. 434, 42 N. E. 22 (1895).
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When Warren and Brandeis wrote their article, radio and talking pictures
were unknown. Hence, they did not deem it necessary to advocate protection
against any kind of oral representations. Today, however, it is obvious that
protection should be given against abuse by these agencies.
Proceeding on the Warren-Brandeis conception of privacy, and incorporating into it oral representations both by radio and talking pictures, as well as
Dean Green's strict "privacy", let us examine the cases usually cited as recognizing or denying the existence of the right of privacy, keeping in mind the
distinction that the injury should be to the state of mind or feelings, and not to
any property interests.
A careful study discloses that there are but four 10 American jurisdictions
in which it may, with reasonable certainty, be predicted that relief at law on a
o Georgia-Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co., supra note 3 (use of plaintiff's picture for advertising defendant's business) ; Byfield v. Candler, 33 Ga. App. 275, 125
S. E. 905 (1925)

(breaking into plaintiff's stateroom).

Kansas-Kunz v. Allen, supra note 3 (exhibiting plaintiff's likeness in motion picture
which advertised defendant's business).
Kentucky-Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225, 37 S. W. (2d) 46 (1931) (tapping telephone
wire and listening to plaintiff's conversations) ; Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S. W.
967 (927) (publishing the fact that plaintiff owes money and won't pay). With regard to
two other Kentucky cases usually cited for the right of privacy, the first, Douglass v. Stokes,
149 Ky. 506, 149 S. W. 849 (1912), was decided on the ground of breach of trust, and the
other, Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn, 134 Ky., 424, 120 S. W. 364 (19o9), on the ground of
libel. Thus they are not true privacy cases.
New York-Legal and equitable relief to a limited extent (discussed in fext) by virtue
of a statute. N. Y. CiviL RIGHTS LAW (1909) §§ 50, 5I.
The Supreme Court of the District of Columbia (a lower court), in Peed v. Washington Times Co., 55 Wash. L. Rep. 182 (1927), granted relief at law on a pure question of
privacy. This decision, of course, cannot be said to set the Federal law. Another federal
court seemed to deny the existence of the right. See Vassar College v. Loose-Wiles Co., 197
Fed. 982 (W. D. Mo. 1912). No case has reached the United States Supreme Court.
An excellent decision of the Supreme Court of Baltimore City, Graham v. Baltimore
Post Co. et al., The Daily Record, Baltimore, Nov. 9, 1932, at 3, recognizes the right of
privacy. The Maryland court of last resort has not decided a privacy case at law but has
decided against equitable protection for privacy. Chappell v. Stewart, 82 Md. 323, 33 AtI.
542 (1896).

An anomalous California case should be noted. In Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285,
Pac. 91 (93), the unsavory past life of a reformed and respectable plaintiff was
taken from the court record of a murder trial and made into a motion picture which exposed
her name. The court held no recovery could be had on the privacy theory because the matter
contained in court records is public. But damages were allowed on the basis of the words of
the state Constitution to the effect that all people shall be entitled to "pursue happiness," the
court saying (at 292, 297 Pac. at 93) "Whether we call this a right of privacy or give it
any other name is immaterial, because it is a right guaranteed by our constitution.
In view of the fact that the complaint alleges that the plaintiff was exposed to "obloquy, contempt, and scorn" and also asked damages for "mental and physical suffering", it is difficult to
know whether the damages were for injury to reputation, with mental suffering tacked on,
as in libel, or whether they were purely for injury to feelings, as in the right of privacy.
In a recent article, Kacedan, The Right of Privacy (1932) 12 B. U. L. REV. 353, 646 n.,
the author says that "six states have recognized the right of privacy and three states
have rejected it". He does not identify those states but refers the reader to his footnotes"124 to I8i". The cases that he discusses involve many types of interests including, among
others, interests in relation with other persons, and defamation. Thus it is difficult to know
which states he believes to recognize the right of privacy, and which not. One of the cases
(cited p. 388) which Mr. Kacedan may have considered a privacy case is Magouirk v. Western Union Tel. Co., 79 Miss. 632, 31 So. 206 (19o2) which seems to have been decided on
the ground of defamation. Perhaps he includes California as recognizing the right of privacy on the basis of Melvin v. Reid (see discussion supra this note) where the court held
that plaintiff's case was not within the right of privacy as recognized in other states, but gave
relief on another ground. He also states (at p. 395) that "California protects the right of
privacy by statute, making the publication of a person's picture a misdemeanor". This was
CAL. PENAL CODE: (Deering, 1923) § 258, and was repealed by Cal. Stat. 1915, p. 761, CAl.
PENAL CODE (Deering, 1931) 110. Very probably the reason for the repeal was that the statute was so worded as to unduly restrict the reasonable use of photographs by the press. Ac297
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pure question of privacy will be granted. In four jurisdictions 11 the existence
of the right of privacy independent of statute has been denied. The remaining
jurisdictions have either no cases on point, or the cases which seem to be on
point do not accept definitely either of the above views. Among the latter class
the case of Munden v. Harris.1 2 often cited as recognizing the right of privacy,
but which, in fact, seems to have been decided upon another ground, is important. In that case, the plaintiff sought damages for, and an injunction
against, the unauthorized publication of his photograph in connection with an
advertisement of the defendant's product. A demurrer to the declaration was
overruled on the ground that the plaintiff had a property right in his photograph. Qucre, what would this court say about words that invaded privacy?
The situation with regard to equitable relief is confused. It is believed
that, beyond the limit of the statutory protection in New York, 13 there is only
one jurisdiction, Louisiana, a civil law state, in which the injunction has been
used to protect a right of privacy stripped of all property, trust, or contract
interests. In Schwartz v. Edrington,14 the plaintiff signed a petition to incorporate a village and later caused his name to be stricken off the petition. The
defendant, a newspaper editor, continued to publish the petition without removing plaintiff's name. An injunction was granted which restrained the defendant
from including the plaintiff's name upon the petition. This seems to be a pure
case of equitable protection for one of the attributes of personality (i. e., name)
usually included in the right of privacy." 5
cording to its terms, no pictures, except those of public office holders and convicted criminals,

were allowed to be published without consent. Mr. Kacedan also cites (at p. 386) Ex Parte
Warfield, 4o Tex. Crim. 413, 50 S. W. 933 (1899) as protecting the "privacy of the marital
relations". This case affirms the power of a court of equity to enjoin defendant from associ-

ating with plaintiff's wife. Hence the case involves the interest in relation with another per-

son, and has the elements of alienation of affections and tendency to break the marriage contract. It is. therefore, distinguishable from the right of privacy.
U Michigan-Atkinson v. Doherty, supra note 9.
Although this case involved the "interest in relation with another person"-plaintiff's dead husband's name and picture were
used on defendant's cigar label-the court clearly indicated that it did not subscribe to the
existence of the right of privacy. In so doing, it overlooked an earlier decision, DeMay v.
Roberts, 46 Mich. i6o, 9 N. W. 146 (18I), in which a woman recovered damages from a
man who by posing as a physician, witnessed her delivery of a child.
New York-Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N. Y. 538, 64 N. E. 442 (1902)
(plaintiff's likeness used to advertise defendant's flour). This case overruled Marks v. Jaffa,
6 Misc. 29o, 26 N. Y. Supp. 908 (1893), which is cited as being in favor of protection against
appropriation of likeness in Green, supra note 5,at 245 n., and in Note (1929) 43 HARV.L.
REv. 297, 298 n.

Rhode Island-Henry v. Cherry, 30 R. I. 13, 73 Atl. 97 (909) (use of plaintiff's photograph for advertising defendant's product).
Waflungon-Hillman v. Star Publishing Co., 64 Wash. 691, 117 Pac. 594 (191i)(girl's
photograph published with story of her father's arrest),
22 53 Mo. App. 652, 134 S.W. lo76 (i9iI), cited in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE LAw o
TORTS (924) at p. 122 as recognizing the right of privacy.
Supra note Io.
"133 La. 235, 62 So. 66o (1913).

'Another Louisiana case, Itzkovich v. Whitaker, 117 La. 708, 42 So. 228 (19o6), which
is usually cited for the right of privacy (see SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF TORTS (1924)
at p. 122), should be noted. In that case, a police-officer was enjoined from placing plaintiff's photo in police records, plaintiff having been acquitted of the criminal charge. The
court discussed "personal rights", not "right of privacy". The facts of this case were exactly similar to those of Schulman v. Witaker, 117 La. 704, 42 So. 227 (19o6), decided by
the same judge on the same day. fn the Schulman case the court cited the leading case
against the right of privacy (Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Company, supra note ii)
and said (at p. 7o6, 42 So. at 228) that it was "remotely analogous to the case before us",
neither approved nor disapproved it,, but differentiated it by saying, "here the purpose [of
the picture] goes much further. [It] is to remain as evidence of a damning nature." Later
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In Indiana, a board of commissioners was ordered" 6 to block up jail
windows nearest the plaintiff's adjoining home, so that the prisoners and lunatics
could not insult her and look into her rooms. The case was decided on the
ground of nuisance,'" although, the court discussed privacy. Here was a true
privacy case ifl which there was hesitation to grant an injunction without hanging
the decision on the safer and more legalistic word "nuisance".
The unauthorized use of a plaintiff's name and picture for commercial purposes has been restrained on the theory that one has a property interest in his
name and photograph.' 8
1
In Von Thodorovich v. Franz Joseph Association,
a lower federal court
1
enjoined the defendant association from using, for business purposes, the name
and picture of the Austrian 'Emperor. This case, brought by the Austrian
Consul, was decided on the basis of an internationaf itreatr .which empowered
the consul to bring suits for the protection of Austrian nationals. It is obvious
that the decision was designed to protect immigrants from fraud, rather than
to alleviate the feelings of the emperor.
In La Folleite v. Hinkle,2' the late Sehator Robert M. La Follette, who. was
the candidate of the "Progressive" party for the presidency, prosecuted a successful suit to enjoin the use of his name on the election ballot by a rival party,
"The La Follette State Party". This decision was undoubtedly for the protection of political and pecuniary interests, rather than for an invasion of privacy.
The publication of intimate letters has been enjoined 21 on the theory that
the writer has some vague species of property interest in the ideas expressed
therein. The property interest theory was also the basis of the decision of the
New Jersey Court in Vanderbilt v. Mitchell,2' where the director of vital
statistics was ordered to expunge from the public records a false' statement of
plaintiff's paternity of a certain child, lesf it some day be used in evidence
against him. By way of dictum, the court said 22 that it W&oild enjoin even in
the absence of a property right. It is interesting to note that in a later New
Jersey case 24 the vice-chancellor disregarded this hopeful dichiun and said that
a property interest is a necessary prerequisite to the granting of the injunction.
He then proceeded to find a property interest in the informition contained in
bank accounts inorder to etijoin a public prosecutor from examining the accounts
of all Newark policemen.
An injunction against "'rough" (i. e., open and with intentional notoriety)
shadowing by detectives W.s granted in Wisconsin.
Again, unfortunately, the
decision was not predicated on privacy. The magic used in this case was "conspiracy to libel".
In the famous case of Chappell v. Stezvart, -6 the Maryland court refused
to enjoin a detective from shadowing the plaintiff., The ground of the decision
in the opinion (at p. 708, 42 So. at 228) the court said, "The fbregoing [reasoning] applies
equally to the Itzkovitch case, handed down this day." It would sem, then, that the theory
of these cases was not privacy, but the possibility of the picttires some day being used in
evidence against the plaintiffs, or as damaging to thieir respective reputations.
6 Pritchett v. Board of Commissioners, 42 Ind. App. 3, 85 N. E. 32 (1908).
11d. at 131, 85 N. E. at 36.
"Edison v. Edison Polyform Co., 73 N. J. Eq. 136, 67 Atl. 392 (1907).
154 Fed. 911 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1907).
131 Wash. 86, 229 Pac. 317 (1924).
-Baker v. Libbie, 2IO Mass. 599, 97 N. E. 1O9 (i912).
"72 N J.Eq. 910, 67 Atl. 97 (1907).
Id. at 919, 67 Atl. at oo.
' Brex v. Smith, lO4 N. J. Eq. 386, 146 Atl. 34 (1929).
"Schultz v. Frankfort Ins. Co., 15I Wis. 537, 139 N. W. 386 (1913).
Supra note io.
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was that equity will not act to enjoin personal rights '7 in the absence of a
property interest. The interest of personality involved in this case is Dean
Green's restricted "privacy".
In the case of Vassar College v. Loose-Wiles Co.,2 the federal court for
the district of Missouri refused to enjoin the defendant company from using
the plaintiff college's name and insignia as a candy advertisement. It was held
that the plaintiff had no property right in its name and that the injury if any was
"psychological rather than real". The plaintiff's theory was not right of privacy
because, being a corporation, it had no feelings which were subject to injury.
The appropriation of its name and the alleged consequent humiliation of its
students and graduates was the gravamen of the complaint. Had the court
been at all sympathetic with the plaintiff's situation it could have granted the
injunction
by stretching property concepts as had been so often done in other
29
cases.

In Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital,30 the declaration averred that an abnormal child was born to the plaintiffs and taken to the defendant hospital for
treatment. That after its death defendant took photographs of the child's body
and published them. The plaintiffs asked for damages and injunctive relief.
Defendants demurred to the declaration on the ground that it set forth no cause
of action, it being argued that the "right of privacy" belonged to the child and
died with him. The court in holding that the declaration was good said, "A
petition will not be dismissed as a whole if it sets out a cause of action for any
of the relief prayed". Since the injunction question was not argued, the cause
of action held to be set out in the petition would seem to be the one for damages.
Hence this case is not authority for any equitable proposition. Although the
court talked in terms of privacy, it recognized that there was a tort committed
against the plaintiffs. The case belongs to that class which Dean Green calls
"interest in relations with other persons".31
Injunctive relief has been refused in cases involving "Family Privacy" or
"interests in the relations with other persons": e. g., Atkinson v. Doherty,"
where defendant used the name and photograph of plaintiff's dead husband on
a cigar label, Schuyler v. Curtis,'3 where a statue to a dead woman's memory
was about to be exhibited at a fair in spite of her family's protestations and
wounded feelings, and Corliss v. Walker,34 where defendant threatened to use
the photograph of plaintiff's deceased husband in a biography. 5
The refusal of the New York court, ifn the Roberson case, to protect against
the appropriation of likeness, lead the legislature of that state to enact a statute, 6
which gives legal and equitable protection against the use "for advertising purposes and for the purposes of trade", of the name or picture of any living person, without his consent, and makes such use a misdemeanor. The extent of
the statute's application may be ascertained from a glance at a few of the cases
"In Ashinsky v. Levinson, 256 Pa. 14, ioo Atl. 491 (I917), the court refused to enjoin
defendant from insulting a Rabbi on the street near his synagogue.
1 Fed. 982 (W. D. Mo. 1912).
'97

See Edison v. Edison Polyform Co., supra note i8, and cases cited therein.
171 Ga. 257, 155 S. E. 194 (93o) ; (1931) 79 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 511.
-"Cf. Witte v. Bauderer, 255 S. W. ioi6 (Tex. 1923), where defendant was restrained
from associating with plaintiff's estranged wife; Baumann v. Baumann, 25o N. Y. 382, 165
N. E. 8ig (1929), where defendant was living with plaintiff's husband and representing that
she was his wife, and the court refused to enjoin this appropriation of the plaintiff's name.
mSupra note ii.
3'
Supra note 9.

Supra note 9.
The ground of this decision was that plaintiff's husband had been a famous inventor
and, as such, had become a public character.
3 N. Y. CIviL RIGHXTS LAW (909) §§ 5o, 51.
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decided under it. In Kunz v. Bosselman," the defendant, a dealer in portraits
and photographs, was restrained from selling the plaintiff's picture for commercial purposes. This, like the case of Almind v. Sea Beach Ry. Co.,-8 where the
use of the plaintiff's picture to teach passengers how to alight from street cars
was held actionable, is obviously within the statute. The court refused to enjoin
the showing of a motion picture which depicted the plaintiff at her work as a
street vendor "I and of a news-reel containing plaintiff's picture.4" The ground
upon which these cases were decided was that the public had a legitimate concern in this type of motion picture since it presented current events and showed
actual occurrences as they transpired, rather than fiction. Although each of
these cases would seem to fit into the wording of the statute, the use complained
of was only incidental to the commercial purpose, and the court's distinction
seems both reasonable and, as a-practical matter, necessary. The use of a
pugilist's picture in connection with a newspaper biography 41 and a single reference to a plaintiff by name in a novel, 42 were held to be outside the statute on
the ground that such uses were not for "purposes of trade". Qucere, would
the court have reached the same result in the latter case if the name had been
one that was connected with a recent scandal which was obviously being capitalized by the novel?
Since feelings may be affected quite as seriously when a person's name or
likeness is used non-commercially (e. g., a debutante's photograph thrown in
among the sex stories of a tabloid), it is obvious that the veil of protection set
up by this statute is entirely too narrow. If we to a little deeper than the words
of the statute, it would seem that the real purpose is to prevent profit-making
by the appropriation of the name and likeness of another, rather than to establish
substantial relief for invasions of privacy.
The desirability of statutory protection for the right of privacy has been
questioned because of the way the New York courts have been departing from
the words of the statute in order to arrive at a reasonable result. It may be
suggested that if there is no statute, courts will, a fortiori, reach what they conceive to be the reasonable result. Hence if a court is 'inclined against the right
of privacy, the existence of a statute will, if anything, deter it from dealing too
harshly with the plaintiff's claim. It should also be noted in this connection that
the New York statute has been strictly construed 4 because of the penal provision
which it contains.
The desirability of criminal legislation for the protection of the right of
privacy was suggested in the Warren-Brandeis article.44 From a practical point
of view, penal legislation 45 is required in at least one type of privacy case, mdz.,
X131 App. Div. 288, 115 N. Y. Supp. 65o (1go9).
157 App. Div. 230, 141 N. Y. Supp. 842. (i913).

Blumenthal v. Pictures Classics Inc., 235 App. Div. 570, 257 N. Y. Supp. 8oo (1932).
40 Humiston v. Universal Film Co., 189 App. Div. 467, 178 N. Y. Supp. 752 (1919).
"Jeffries v. New York Evening Journal, 67 Misc. 570, 124 N. Y. Supp. 78o (191o).
Damron v. Doubleday Doran & Co., 133 Misc. 302, 231 N. Y. Supp. 444 (1928).
See Humiston v. Universal Film Co., supra note 40.

"

Supra note

I, at 219.

Mention should be made of some other penal provisions closely related to the right of
privacy. A majority of states make it a crime to intercept a message sent by telegraph or
telephone, whether the interception is by wire-tapping or otherwise. The statutes are collected in a note to Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S.438, 479, 48 Sup. Ct. 564, 573 (1927).
A statute making it a felony to engage in the business of publishing or circulating a newspaper devoted mainly to scandal was held to be constitutional in State v. Van Wye, 136 Mo.
227, 37 S.W. 938 (1896). A statute providing that the publication of a scandalous newspaper is a nuisance, and may be abated by injunction, was held constitutional in State v.
Guilford, 174 Minn. 457, 239 N. W. 770 (1928), but in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S.697, 51
Sup. Ct. 625 (1930), it was held unconstitutional as applied to a publication charging an
official with corruption in office.
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that in which the annoyance is petty but frequent and where the harm is not
serious enough to impel a person to seek redress in a civil suit. An example of
this type of legislation recently appeared in Wyoming, where a town council
enacted an ordinance providing that it should be "a nuisance and misdemeanor"
for solicitors, peddlers and salesmen to go "in and upon" private residences
(unless by previous invitation of the occupants) for the purpose of soliciting
orders for, or selling, goods. In a suit by the Fuller Brush Company 10 (door
to door solicitors), the ordinance was held to be unconstitutional, because it went
beyond the police power and violated plaintiff's rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The constitutionality of this ordinance does not depend on whether or not
the act prohibited is called a nuisance. Only two considerations are important.
First, had the plaintiff a constitutional right to go onto all private residences for
the purpose of selling its wares? Second, had those residents who desired salesmen to come to their homes a constitutional right that the salesman should come
without previous invitation? Both questions are resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the ordinance by the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Williams v. Arkansas.4 7 In that case, a state statute, prohibiting
solicitors for hotels and physicians from soliciting on railway trains, was held
valid. If such persons can be constitutionally deprived of their "right" to solicit
on trains, a fortiori an ordinance prohibiting entrance upon private homes for
solicitation should be valid. With regard to the second question, any people on
the trains who might welcome the services of the solicitors were deprived of
such services by the decision of the court in order that the greater number of
people should be spared annoyance. This same reasoning should apply to those
who want salesmen to call at their homes. It would be far less troublesome
for those few persons to invite the salesmen, than for the rest of the population
to be annoyed in trying to send them away.
It would seem that the purpose of this ordinance was to prevent one of
those annoyances (viz., annoyances by door to door salesmen) which are caused
by invasions of privacy in Dean Green's strict sense, i. e., solitude and seclusion.
It sought to protect the same interest, by criminal provision, that the Georgia
court recognized in Byfield v. Candler,48 where plaintiff recovered damages for
defendant's breaking into her stateroom. The invasion of privacy in that case
was beyond mere annoyance, or petty vexation, because it was accompanied with
manifestations of an intention, on the part of the defendant, to rape the plaintiff.
Hence, the plaintiff had that motive to seek redress in a civil suit which is not
present when the privacy interest is invaded by a mere intruder, such as a
salesman.
This exposition of the cases, it is hoped, will reveal the paucity of honest
progress that is being made with the true privacy concept. The reasons assigned
by those courts which have definitely repudiated privacy as a legally protected
right are, in the main, two. First, "It is unknown to the common law and to
establish it is a legislative function". 49 Secondly, to protect privacy would
encourage vexatious, absurd and trumped-up litigation." The answer to the
first objection is, obviously, legislation. And to the second, that the objection
itself is invalid, since bona fide claims should not go unremedied merely because
some dishonest ones might prevail.
" Fuller Brush Company v. Town of Green River, 6o F. (2d) 613 (932).
This case was overlooked by court and counsel
'7 217 U. S. 79, 30 Sup. Ct 493 (19o9).
in the Fuller Brush case, supra note 46.
"Supra note o.
''Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Company, supra note ii, at 556, 64 N. E. at 447;
HUllman v. Star Publishing Co., supra note ii, at 696, 117 Pac. at 596.

wRoberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., supra note II, at 545, 64 N. E. at 447.
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Probably the most cogent reason for denying equitable relief springs from
Lord Eldon's unfortunate dictum in Gee v. Pritchard " to the effect that equity
protects only property interests.
It is obvious that the need for equitable relief is especially urgent. The
type of person who will object to the exploitation of his private life is at once
the type whose wounded sensibilities will not be "made whole" by a judgment
for money damages. Property may be sufficient to compensate property loss,
but it is, in the very nature of things, inadequate to mend outraged feelings.
The prevention of the occurrence of a threatened invasion of privacy and the
enjoining of an existing invasion are essentials of real relief. It can hardly be
hoped that the "beautiful growth of judge-made law" will aid in bringing about
this result in view of the equity decisions since Lord Eldon's momentous dictum
concerning the necessity of a property right. It is true that the courts have
been breaking through that alleged rule by stretching property concepts. But,
even disregarding the undesirability of this hypocrisy, what happens in those
cases in which the concept of property rights cannot be sufficiently extended?
Obviously, the magic disappears, the plaintiff goes without relief and the defendant may continue to offend with impunity. This fact, together with the paltry
number of jurisdictions in which even damages at law may be recovered without
injury to some sort of property interest, or confidential, trust or contract relation, and the additional fact that those courts which have refused to protect privacy assign lack of precedent as the main reason, indicates the present need for
legislation. The chief objection to statutory protection would be one of definition
and drafting. To what extent shall protection be afforded? What is legitimate
news and what is not? Who is a public character, and how far can the statute go
without violating the constitutional guaranty of freedom of the press? But
need the statute go into all these details? It might well be drafted in such words
as would leave the actual definitions of extent and general moulding of the
concepts with the more -flexible machinery of the court. Frequent use of the
convenient word "reasonable" would not be amiss in such a statute. It would
leave the courts to deal with cases as they arose and relieve the legislatures from
anticipating all possible situations in which privacy questions might arise. In
short, the statute would pull the courts over the "no-precedent" hurdle, and
leave the rest to the judges.
E.A.K.
62 Swanston

403, 413 (1818).

